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Reconciling Rights: The Whatcott
Case as Missed Opportunity
Cara Faith Zwibel*
“We often miss opportunity because it’s
dressed in overalls and looks like work.”
— Thomas A. Edison

I. A MISSED OPPORTUNITY
The Supreme Court of Canada’s recent consideration of the hate
speech provisions1 in the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code2 was an
opportunity to grapple with several fundamental rights and freedoms that
frequently come into conflict. The case — Saskatchewan (Human Rights
Commission) v. Whatcott3 — grew out of what some might consider minor
incidents of flyer distribution in some Saskatchewan neighbourhoods.
Like most cases considered by the Court, however, it has implications
that extend well beyond the interests of the parties to the appeal and may
have ripple effects in a number of different areas.
*
Cara Faith Zwibel is Director of the Fundamental Freedoms Program at the Canadian
Civil Liberties Association. The views represented in this article are my own. I am grateful to
Marc Gibson, articling student-at-law, for his research assistance and his help in commenting on an
earlier draft of this paper.
1
While I will refer to the relevant provisions of human rights statutes as “hate speech
provisions” throughout this paper, they should be distinguished from the Criminal Code’s
prohibition on the wilful promotion of hatred, as set out in s. 319(2): R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. While the
definition of hatred and the standard the courts use to assess expression against this definition is the
same, there are significant differences. For example, no proceeding under s. 319(2) of the Criminal
Code may be commenced without the consent of the Attorney General; see also Criminal Code,
s. 319(6). In addition, there is a mens rea or intent requirement associated with the Criminal Code
section, and defences are available. The human rights provisions do not have an intent requirement,
are driven by individual complaints, and there are no defences since the focus is on the impact of the
expression, rather than its purpose or intended consequences. In addition, the Criminal Code and
human rights provisions allow for different types of penalties/remedies.
2
S.S. 1979, c. S-24.1 [hereinafter “Saskatchewan Human Rights Code”].
3
[2013] S.C.J. No. 11, 276 C.R.R. (2d) 270 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Whatcott”].
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The Whatcott case created an opportunity to examine the foundations
of freedom of expression, as well as what constitutional protection of the
right means for Canadian society. At the same time, Whatcott provided
the Court with a chance to look at our ongoing struggle to achieve equality and eradicate discrimination, and at the tools that some Canadian
jurisdictions have chosen to accomplish these goals. Finally, the case allowed the Court to examine one of its own important precedents and
consider whether reasoning that was rooted in a different time could be
maintained in light of the evolution of the law and social realities. Put
briefly, Whatcott was about much more than whether a single individual,
with strongly held religious objections to homosexual behaviour, could
distribute literature to some Saskatchewan homes.
In this article, I argue that Whatcott represents a missed opportunity
to delve into the difficult process of reconciling competing rights and
freedoms and address the efficacy of the hate speech provisions. While I
critique both the outcome of the case and the Court’s reasoning, it is the
latter that will be the focus of this discussion. Regardless of one’s view
on the constitutionality or effectiveness of hate speech provisions, the
Court’s reasons for decision simply fail to adequately address the important issues the case raises. This failure led the Court to ignore both
Canada’s historical and practical experience with hate speech provisions
in human rights statutes, and the future implications of the decision to
continue down this path.
I will begin by placing Whatcott in historical context and reviewing
the Supreme Court of Canada’s first consideration of a hate speech provision in human rights legislation: Canada (Human Rights Commission)
v. Taylor.4 I will then briefly survey some of the jurisprudence coming
from Canadian jurisdictions with similar provisions and review a few of
the changes that have occurred by way of legislative amendment and judicial consideration. I will also briefly touch on the thoughtful review of
the federal hate speech provision undertaken by Richard Moon in 2008,
at the request of the Canadian Human Rights Commission (“CHRC”)
and some of the debates and controversy that led to that review.
The bulk of this article will be dedicated to analyzing the Whatcott
decision itself. I will argue that the Court failed to give adequate
consideration to whether hate speech provisions in human rights codes
are well suited to achieving the goals or objectives they are designed to

4

[1990] S.C.J. No. 129, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Taylor”].
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achieve and that, in so doing, the Court missed an opportunity to address
some core issues. First, the Court avoided addressing the subjectivity
concern that has been at the heart of most critiques of hate speech laws.
Careful consideration of the experience with human rights provisions and
with its own decision in Taylor over the last two decades would have
illustrated the impact that the necessarily vague and subjective
understanding of hatred has had on the robust protection of freedom of
expression. Second, the Court missed an opportunity to elaborate on the
kinds of harms that hate speech laws are designed to prevent and closely
consider how effectively these laws operate in practice. The courts have
given hatred a narrow construction in order to safeguard freedom of
expression, but in so doing they have failed to examine how effective
such a definition is in achieving the legislature’s goal — namely,
preventing discrimination. While the use of inflammatory and hateful
language may be easier for a court to identify as hate speech, these forms
of expression may also be less likely to incite hatred than subtler, but
perhaps more insidious, messages. I will argue that, at best, the Supreme
Court of Canada’s reasoning on these issues is incomplete and
convoluted, and that the Court missed a rare opportunity to examine how
to reconcile freedom of expression, freedom of religion and equality
when they come into conflict. I conclude by positing that the outcome in
Whatcott (including Mr. Whatcott’s behaviour following the decision),
highlights the limits of what the law can achieve when it comes to
difficult social problems like racism, homophobia and discrimination
more broadly.

II. HUMAN RIGHTS CODES AND HATE SPEECH: SOME HISTORY
Although every Canadian jurisdiction has enacted a human rights
code to address discrimination in a variety of forums, not all have opted
to address hateful expression. Such provisions are found in the human
rights codes of Saskatchewan,5 Alberta,6 British Columbia7 and the
Northwest Territories,8 as well as in the federal Canadian Human Rights
Act.9 While there are minor variations in the wording of some of the
5
6
7
8
9

Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, supra, note 2, s. 14(1)(b).
Alberta Human Rights Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-25.5, s. 3(1)(b).
Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210, s. 7(1)(b).
Human Rights Act, S.N.W.T. 2002, c. 18, s. 13(1)(c).
Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, s. 13 [hereinafter “CHRA” or the “Act”].
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provisions, each is directed at forms of expression that expose or are
likely to expose a person or group of persons to hatred or contempt on
the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination.
1. The Taylor Standard
The Supreme Court first considered the federal hate speech provision
in Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor.10 The Taylor decision
was rendered on the same day as R. v. Keegstra,11 which addressed the
constitutionality of the Criminal Code prohibition on hate speech. In
both cases, a seven-judge panel of the Court split 4-3 in upholding the
constitutionality of the provisions.
The Taylor case concerned the distribution of cards that invited
recipients to call a telephone number. The number was answered by
recorded messages that, according to the Court, denigrated the Jewish race
and religion.12 Taylor argued that section 13(1) of the CHRA13 violated
section 2(b), the Charter’s14 guarantee of freedom of expression, in a
manner that could not be reasonably justified in a free and democratic
society. The Taylor Court was unanimous in finding that the prohibition
in section 13(1) of the CHRA violated section 2(b), and rejected the
notion that the offensive content of messages could be sufficient reason
to deny protection under section 2(b). Both the majority and dissent were
also convinced that Parliament’s objective of promoting equality and
prohibiting discriminatory practices were pressing and substantial goals.
10

Taylor, supra, note 4.
[1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.).
12
The complaints against Mr. Taylor and the Western Guard Party were initially brought to
the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal (“CHRT”) in 1979, prior to the enactment of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, infra, note 14. The Tribunal found a contravention of s. 13(1) of
the CHRA and made a cease and desist order that was filed with the Federal Court and could be
enforced as a court order. Taylor and his party continued to engage in the practices and eventually
Taylor had to serve a year in prison for contempt, while the Party was responsible for paying a
$5,000 fine. Even after serving time in jail, Mr. Taylor and the Party resumed the telephone service.
When the CHRC once again sought to enforce the Tribunal’s Order, the Charter had come into effect.
13
Section 13(1) states:
It is a discriminatory practice for a person or a group of persons acting in concert to
communicate telephonically or to cause to be so communicated, repeatedly, in whole or
in part by means of the facilities of a telecommunication undertaking within the legislative authority of Parliament, any matter that is likely to expose a person or persons to
hatred or contempt by reason of the fact that that person or those persons are identifiable
on the basis of a prohibited ground of discrimination.
14
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”].
11
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The judges parted ways, however, in assessing the proportionality of
section 13(1) in light of these goals. Chief Justice Dickson, writing for the
majority, held that the phrase “hatred and contempt” could be interpreted
in a way that was sufficiently precise and narrow to be proportional to the
legislative objective. To make this finding, Dickson C.J.C. confined the
definition of “hatred and contempt” to “unusually strong and deep-felt
emotions of detestation, calumny and vilification”.15
On the other hand, McLachlin J. (as she then was), writing for the
dissent, found the “broad and vague ambit”16 of the provision troubling
and ultimately fatal to the section’s constitutionality. Justice McLachlin
held that the provision was not rationally connected to its objective
because it went further than necessary to achieve it. In contrast to the
majority, she found that the breadth of the provision made it difficult to
determine where mere dislike ends and hatred begins. In her words
“[T]he phrase does not assist in sending a clear and precise indication to
members of society as to what the limits of impugned speech are.”17
While McLachlin J. characterized the process envisaged by the Act as
“exemplary”18 in terms of its balancing of freedom of expression and
discrimination interests, she nevertheless concluded that it effectively
delegated the power to infringe the Charter and that the chilling effect of
the section’s breadth could not be ignored. Justice McLachlin also noted
the absence of any defences to violations of section 13(1) under the Act.
She acknowledged that this was consistent with the legislation’s remedial
focus, but concluded that this factor also served to broaden the section’s
application and further contributed to its failure to meet the rational
connection test under section 1 of the Charter.19 In balancing the
importance of freedom of expression as against the benefit sought to be
gained (i.e., the elimination or reduction of discrimination), McLachlin J.
characterized the infringement as “most serious” since it touched on
“expression which may be relevant to social and political issues”.20
Significantly, she also questioned some of the concerns raised about the
damage caused by hate speech, noting that the ability of the prohibition
to deal effectively with discrimination was not clear-cut. As a result,
15
16
17
18
19

Taylor, supra, note 4, at 928.
Id., at 959.
Id., at 962.
Id., at 964.
As laid out in R. v. Oakes, [1986] S.C.J. No. 7, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter

“Oakes”].
20

Taylor, supra, note 4, at 968.
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McLachlin J. concluded that the benefits of the provision were not worth
its substantial costs.
The dissent in the Taylor case puts forth both classic freedom of
speech arguments with a more targeted look at the mechanism chosen by
Parliament in the CHRA and how it could, and did, operate. At the heart
of the dissent is a concern about the breadth of the prohibition, its
subjective nature, and its ability to address the harm at which it is aimed.
In my view, these are the same issues that needed to be addressed in the
Whatcott case, particularly in light of the experience with hate speech
provisions in the more than 20 years since Taylor.
2. Developments Post-Taylor
Even though the tribunals tasked with interpreting and applying hate
speech provisions have, in general, made use of the Taylor definition,
they have also recognized the need for more specific tools to help weed
out speech that is simply offensive and ensure that they only capture the
extreme and unusual species of expression known as “hatred”. Attempts
have been made by tribunals and courts to particularize the meaning of
this term and render it more concrete. Thus, in Warman v. Kouba21 a
member of the CHRT reviewed the jurisprudence under the Act’s hate
speech provision and developed a number of “hallmarks of hatred” to
help differentiate hate speech from other offensive commentary. These
hallmarks include:
(1) portraying the targeted group as a “powerful menace”;
(2) the use of true stories to make negative generalizations about the
group;
(3) portraying the group as preying on children, the aged or other vulnerable persons;
(4) blaming the group for current problems;
(5) portraying them as violent or dangerous by nature;
(6) conveying the idea that the members of the group have no redeeming qualities and are simply evil;

21

[2006] C.H.R.D. No. 50, 2006 CHRT 50 (Can. H.R.T.) [hereinafter “Kouba”].
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(7) communicating the idea that the banishment, segregation or eradication of the group is necessary to save others from harm;
(8) dehumanizing the group by comparisons to animals, vermin, excrement and other noxious substances;
(9) using highly inflammatory and derogatory language to create a tone
of extreme hatred and contempt;
(10) trivializing or celebrating past persecution or tragedy involving
group members; and
(11) calling for violent action against the group.22
It is not necessary to have all of these hallmarks of hatred in order to
run afoul of the law, and the list is not intended to be exhaustive, but it
did prove useful for tribunal members struggling with the inherent subjectivity of hatred. The list also helps to demonstrate the truly extreme
nature of the expression that these provisions aim to capture.
Hate speech cases can make a big splash in the media and are frequently the subject of controversy, but they actually represent a very
small proportion of what human rights tribunals do. Between 2001 and
2008, the hate speech complaints made to the federal Commission represented about 2 per cent of the total complaints received.23 Of this 2 per
cent (representing 73 complaints), only 16 were actually adjudicated by
the Tribunal and in each one the Tribunal determined that there had been
a violation of section 13.24 Figures showing the proportion of hate speech
complaints that were referred to a provincial tribunal are not easily accessible, but it suffices to say that hate speech cases are not at all
representative of the work typically done by human rights tribunals.
Moreover, at least at the federal level, a large number of the cases that
ultimately resulted in hearings before the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal were brought by a single individual complainant. The individual,
Richard Warman, is a former investigator for the Canadian Human
Rights Commission, although he initiated most of his complaints after he
22

Id., at paras. 24-77.
These figures are taken from Richard Moon, Report to the Canadian Human Rights
Commission Concerning Section 13 of the Canadian Human Rights Act and the Regulation of Hate
Speech on the Internet (Ottawa: Canadian Human Rights Commission, 2008), at 12 [hereinafter
“Moon Report”]. The Moon Report is discussed further below.
24
Id. At the time that the Moon Report was published, 34 of the 73 complaints were sent to
the CHRT and 10 were resolved before adjudication; eight of the complaints that were sent to the
CHRT were awaiting conciliation or adjudication.
23
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left that position. Mr. Warman sought out hateful expression on the Internet and participated in online discussion forums on these sites to assess
how to best proceed with a complaint. The cases he initiated are not representative of what Parliament likely had in mind when the provision
was enacted and there is little evidence that vulnerable groups have seen
section 13 as a vital tool in their struggle for equality.
Despite the small number of cases that have been the subject of
adjudication, there has been some heated debate and discussion in the
academic literature and the mainstream media about the role of human rights
commissions in hate speech cases.25 The debate came to the fore when some
mainstream publications were the subject of complaints to commissions and,
in the case of Maclean’s magazine, a hearing before the B.C. Human Rights
Tribunal.26 Some commentators, including Ezra Levant and Mark Steyn
(who were both subjects of complaints), mounted campaigns that were
deeply critical of the CHRC and the restriction of freedom of expression by
human rights tribunals more generally.
Perhaps as a result of the criticisms, in 2008 the Canadian Human
Rights Commission asked law professor Richard Moon to report on
mechanisms to address hate messages, particularly those on the Internet.
Professor Moon’s report is a thorough discussion on some of the tensions
inherent in the interpretation of section 13. In particular, he points out
that while the Tribunal is generally charged with addressing discrimination and giving a large and liberal interpretation to the CHRA, protection
of freedom of expression requires a narrow understanding of what constitutes hatred for the purposes of section 13. Professor Moon
recommended repealing section 13 and included a variety of other recommendations to address the issue of hateful messages in the event the
provision was not repealed.27
The statutory language used by section 13 of the CHRA to describe
the types of messages prohibited has not changed since Taylor. However,
that provision was amended in 2001 to make explicit that it applied to
25

For a helpful discussion on why human rights commissions and, in particular, the CHRC,
have received increased attention in recent years, particularly with respect to hate speech provisions,
see R. Moon, “The Attack on Human Rights Commissions and the Corruption of Public Discourse”
(2011) 73 Sask. L.J. 93 [hereinafter “Moon, ‘The Attack’”].
26
See Elmasry v. Roger’s Publishing, [2008] B.C.H.R.T.D. No. 378, 64 C.H.R.R. D/509
(B.C.H.R.T.). The process in B.C. is different in that, in general, all complaints go directly to the
tribunal without a human rights commission performing a screening function.
27
The Moon Report also noted that there was widespread misunderstanding about the
complaint process under the CHRA. Professor Moon subsequently addressed many of these
misconceptions in Moon, “The Attack”, supra, note 25.
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hate messages on the Internet.28 Since this clarification was made, the
provision has frequently been applied to websites where the predominant
messages are hateful diatribes against a wide variety of groups protected
by the Act. The accessibility of the Internet in Canadian society and the
ability to quickly transmit messages repeatedly via social networks has
only served to intensify debate about hate speech laws, particularly since
Canada has no jurisdiction to regulate or attempt to shut down websites
that are hosted in other countries, but available to Canadian readers.
In the Fall of 2011, a Private Member’s Bill was introduced proposing section 13’s repeal. Shortly before this paper went to press, the bill
was passed and received Royal Assent.29 This means that there will no
longer be a hate speech provision in the CHRA, although its counterparts
in several provincial jurisdictions (including the Saskatchewan provision
at issue in Whatcott) do remain in place.

III. THE WHATCOTT DECISION
1. Facts and Judicial History
The Whatcott case was heard in October of 2011 by a seven-judge
panel of the Court.30 It took the Court until late February of 2013
(16 months) to render a decision and, by that time, one of the panel
members, Deschamps J., had retired. As a result, the case represents the
views of only two-thirds of the Supreme Court bench.31
The case arose out of four flyers distributed in Regina and Saskatoon
by Mr. Whatcott on behalf of a group known as the Christian Truth

28

Section 13(2) of the CHRA states: “For greater certainty, subsection (1) applies in respect
of a matter that is communicated by means of a computer or a group of interconnected or related
computers, including the Internet, or any similar means of communication, but does not apply in
respect of a matter that is communicated in whole or in part by means of the facilities of a
broadcasting undertaking.”
29
Bill C-304, An Act to amend the Canadian Human Rights Act (Protecting Freedom),
1st Sess., 41st Parl., 2011 [hereinafter “Bill C-304”]. This Bill received Royal Assent on June 26,
2013 but does not come into force until June 26, 2014.
30
At the time that the appeal was heard, Binnie and Charron JJ. had retired, but Moldaver
and Karakatsanis JJ. were not appointed until a few days after the hearing.
31
In light of the six-judge panel, it seems likely that a unanimous decision was considered
important in this case. It is particularly interesting that McLachlin C.J.C., the author of strong
dissents in both Taylor and Keegstra, neither dissented in Whatcott to reiterate the concerns
expressed in earlier decisions, nor wrote the decision to explain whether her views had changed or
she felt bound by precedent.
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Activists.32 Two of the flyers were identical and consisted of a reprint of
a page of classified ads with the addition of handwritten comments. The
other two flyers, entitled “Keep Homosexuality out of Saskatoon’s Public
Schools!” and “Sodomites in our Public Schools” dealt with the topics of
homosexuality in public schools, and included biblical references and
quotes as well as calls for individuals to contact their school authorities
on the subject of the “corruption” of school children with “sodomite
propaganda”. Four individuals who had received the flyers at home
lodged complaints with the Human Rights Commission alleging a
violation of section 14 of the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code
(“SHRC” or “Saskatchewan Code”) and the matter proceeded before the
Saskatchewan Human Rights Tribunal. The Tribunal found a violation of
the section and held that section 14(1)(b) was a reasonable limitation on
section 2(b) of the Charter. Mr. Whatcott was ordered to pay
compensation to the complainants, and he and his group were prohibited
from distributing the flyers and any similar materials.
On appeal, the Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench upheld the
Tribunal’s decision. The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, however, disagreed and concluded that the material distributed by Mr. Whatcott did
not violate section 14 of the Code. In two separate judgments, members
of the Court of Appeal found that the moral context of the expression at
issue needed to be taken account and one judge put significant emphasis
on the idea that the flyers took issue with sexual conduct and not with
individuals. While the Court of Appeal did uphold the constitutionality of
the hate speech provision in the Saskatchewan Code, the Court’s reasons
show a concern about the breadth of the provision and its potential to
unduly limit freedom of expression.
The Saskatchewan Human Rights Commission appealed to the
Supreme Court of Canada and Mr. Whatcott made a motion to state
constitutional questions with respect to the constitutionality of
Saskatchewan’s hate speech provision. Following years of debate and
discussion about the effectiveness of hate speech provisions at the federal
level, as well as a Saskatchewan Court of Appeal decision that seriously
questioned how to address religious beliefs that might be expressed in
offensive or even hateful terms, the stage was set for a thorough look at
how the hate speech regime was operating. The Court was given an
opportunity to reconsider the constitutionality of hate speech laws
32

decision.

The full text of all four of the flyers is included in an appendix to the Supreme Court’s
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enshrined in human rights statutes in light of over two decades of
experience.
2. The Court’s Unanimous Decision
The unanimous Supreme Court judgment, written by Rothstein J.,
upheld the constitutionality of section 14(1)(b) of the Saskatchewan
Code.33 The decision recognized that, although the wording of the
Saskatchewan provision does not precisely mirror the federal provision,
the Taylor definition of “hatred” has generally been the one applied in
cases under Saskatchewan’s Code.34 Indeed, the Saskatchewan Court of
Appeal had already effectively read out the portion of the Code that
would allow a finding that ridiculing, belittling or otherwise affronting
the dignity of a person or class of persons on the basis of a prohibited
ground constituted a violation.35 The Court rejected the idea that the
Taylor definition of hatred is necessarily subjective and overly broad.
According to the Court, Taylor provides a workable definition as long as
it is interpreted with three key rules in mind:
(1) There must be an objective component to the proper interpretation
of hatred, thus making the relevant question whether a reasonable
person, aware of the context and circumstances of the case, would
view the expression as exposing the protected group to hatred.
(2) Only the most extreme forms of expression are caught by the term
“hatred”.
(3) The focus in cases under this provision must be on the effect of the
expression at issue rather than the offensiveness of the content on its
own.36

33

That section states:
14(1) No person shall publish or display, or cause or permit to be published or
displayed, on any lands or premises or in a newspaper, through a television or radio
broadcasting station or any other broadcasting device, or in any printed matter or publication
or by means of any other medium that the person owns, controls, distributes or sells, any
representation, including any notice, sign, symbol, emblem, article, statement or other
representation … that exposes or tends to expose to hatred, ridicules, belittles or otherwise
affronts the dignity of any person or class of persons on the basis of a prohibited ground.
34
Whatcott, supra, note 3, at para. 87.
35
Owens v. Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission), [2006] S.J. No. 221, 279 Sask. R.
161 (Sask. C.A.) [hereinafter “Owens”].
36
Whatcott, supra, note 3, at paras. 56-58.
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The Court accepted that section 14(1)(b) of the Saskatchewan Code
violated section 2(b) of the Charter, but concluded that when interpreted
in this manner, it is a reasonable limit on freedom of expression. As in
Taylor, the Court’s section 1 analysis accepted that the legislature had a
pressing and substantial objective in seeking to curb hateful expression,
but the Court arguably reframed that objective slightly in Whatcott. The
Taylor majority talked about two types of harms occasioned by hate
speech: the injury done to the feelings and self-esteem of the discrete
groups being targeted, and the possibility that hateful messages might
operate to convince others that those groups are inferior. In Whatcott the
Court seems to shift away from the former type of harm, focusing much
more on the harm that hate speech may do to society as a whole. Justice
Rothstein held that the provision is about more than protecting individuals from humiliation and/or hurt feelings. Rather, he held that hate speech
provisions in human rights statutes “aim to eliminate the most extreme
type of expression that has the potential to incite or inspire discriminatory treatment against protected groups on the basis of a prohibited
ground”.37
The goal of hate speech legislation, according to the Court, is to prevent discriminatory treatment. The judgment goes to great lengths to
make the point that the focus should be on the likely effects of the expression rather than “the nature of the ideas expressed”.38 The judgment
even states explicitly that the section does not protect vulnerable groups
against expression that debates the merits of reducing their rights, simply
expression that might expose them to hatred in the context of such a debate. According to Rothstein J., the section “does not target the ideas, but
their mode of expression in public and the effect that this mode of expression may have”.39 In addition, the Court states that the assessment of
whether a particular instance of expression amounts to hatred is a casespecific inquiry which will depend on context and circumstance.
As had already been done by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in
Owens,40 the Supreme Court read out that part of section 14(1)(b) which,
in its view, did not rise to the level of extreme hatred. The Court determined that the portion of the provision that refers to expression that
“ridicules, belittles or otherwise affronts the dignity of” protected groups
37
38
39
40

Id., at para. 48.
Id., at para. 49.
Id., at paras. 51-52.
Supra, note 35.
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would capture too much. As a result, Rothstein J. held that this part of the
provision was not rationally connected to the legislature’s goal of addressing systemic discrimination.
In terms of assessing whether section 14(1)(b) is a minimal impairment of freedom of expression, the Court acknowledged that there may
be a variety of ways to achieve the legislature’s goals, but found that the
one chosen in this case was reasonable. The Court considered several of
the arguments made by those who argue that the section is overly broad,
in particular the concern that there is no intent requirement, there is no
requirement for proof of harm, and the section does not provide for any
defences (including the defence of truth). It dismissed each of these in
turn with a rather brief and perfunctory analysis.41
Since Mr. Whatcott argued that the views he expressed in his flyers
were rooted in his religious beliefs, the Court also had to consider the
claim that section 14(1)(b) of the Saskatchewan Code infringes freedom
of religion. The Court held that a violation of section 2(a) was established but that, for reasons substantially similar to those with respect to
section 2(b), the infringement was justified under section 1.42
Finally, having found that the section withstood constitutional scrutiny, the Court applied it to the facts. The Court concluded that two of
Mr. Whatcott’s flyers (those relating to homosexuality and the public
school system) did promote hatred under the section, while two others
did not. Notwithstanding that the Tribunal and courts below had all effectively applied the same standard in assessing whether there was a
violation of the Saskatchewan Code, the Supreme Court of Canada’s
conclusion on the issue was different than the one reached by any of the
prior decision-makers.
Conspicuously absent from the decision is a comment by
McLachlin C.J.C. about her dissent in Taylor and what allowed her to
sign on to the unanimous judgment in Whatcott, notwithstanding the
views she had expressed years earlier. It is unclear whether the Chief
Justice simply decided that she had to follow stare decisis and that there
was nothing significant to distinguish Taylor from Whatcott, or whether
her views had simply changed.

41
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Whatcott, supra, note 3, at paras. 25-44.
Id., at paras. 152-164.
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IV. DISSECTING THE WHATCOTT DECISION
In many ways the Whatcott case provided the Court with an
opportunity to carefully and thoughtfully consider its approach to
freedom of expression, freedom of religion, and equality rights and the
role that these fundamental rights have in modern Canadian society. It is
evident that hate speech is far from the most important freedom of
expression issue in Canada. As discussed earlier, complaints under hate
speech provisions of human rights codes are not particularly common
and it is even less common for matters to actually proceed to a hearing
before a tribunal. The Criminal Code prohibition on hate speech, while
still on the books, has fallen into disuse. Nevertheless, hate speech laws
are in many ways a useful litmus test for assessing how freedom of
expression is protected in our society. The real question before the Court
in Whatcott was how well the hate speech provision in Saskatchewan’s
Code “fit” with the objective of trying to reduce or eliminate
discriminatory treatment.
Since Taylor, the Court’s approach to freedom of expression has
evolved in a number of respects, most notably in the realm of the common law of defamation, which has seen a recalibration of the balance
between protection of reputation and freedom of expression.43 In Grant
and Cusson, the Court created a new defence to defamation for responsible communication on matters of public interest. Whereas the Court in
these cases demonstrated a willingness to modernize the law of defamation in light of contemporary developments,44 the Court in Whatcott
retreated to the safety of precedent and avoided a serious reconsideration
of the hate speech provisions. The Court had the opportunity to consider
over 20 years of jurisprudence in this area, as well as a comprehensive
report on Internet hate speech prepared by Professor Moon and academic
critiques and commentaries addressing many sides of the issue. It also
had the chance to consider the revolution in communications technology
that has taken place since Taylor and that has, in many respects, democratized expression. The Internet creates both increased opportunities for
the spread of hateful messages along with a concomitant increase in the
43
See, e.g., Grant v. Torstar Corp., [2009] S.C.J. No. 61, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Grant”] and Quan v. Cusson, [2009] S.C.J. No. 62, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 712 (S.C.C.)
[hereinafter “Cusson”].
44
Along similar lines, the Court in Crookes v. Newton, [2011] S.C.J. No. 47, [2011]
3 S.C.R. 269 (S.C.C.) also took a contemporary approach to considering whether an online hyperlink
constituted publication for the purposes of the common law of defamation.
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ability of individuals to respond to and counter such messages. Although
Whatcott is a case about “old-fashioned” expression (i.e., hard-copy print
media), it is both surprising and disappointing that the Court chose not to
seize the opportunity to undertake a thorough examination of so many of
the important issues to which it gives rise.
1. Avoiding the Subjectivity Problem
On the surface, Rothstein J.’s judgment did attempt to recognize and
address the criticisms of the Taylor definition of “hatred”. He noted that
the critiques fall into two main categories of subjectivity and overbreadth. Significantly, these are primarily the same issues raised by
McLachlin J.’s dissent in Taylor. However, as explored further below,
while Taylor attempted to address those issues as they existed at the time,
the discussion by the Court in Whatcott is evasive and unhelpful in
remedying some of the problems with the application of hate speech provisions that were apparent after nearly a quarter-century of experience.
Justice Rothstein noted that one common concern about hate speech
provisions is that hatred is an emotion and is thus necessarily and inherently subjective. On an intuitive level, this is something that we all know
to be true. Hatred is something we feel in our gut; it is strong and often
irrational, but it is nothing if not personal. Surely our Supreme Court Justices know this as well. Nevertheless, we are told in the Whatcott
judgment that this can be fixed, if only we place our focus on the right
things, namely the “proper meaning” of the words chosen by the legislature and by applying the provision in light of its objectives.45
This suggestion that subjectivity can be avoided or significantly
mitigated by focusing on these issues ignores the reality that, despite
applying the objective Taylor standard, tribunals and courts have
frequently come to opposing conclusions on whether particular
statements meet the definition of hatred. In many of the cases that have
been adjudicated by a tribunal but then appealed to another level, there
has been disagreement about whether the expression being challenged
ran afoul of the legislation.46
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Whatcott, supra, note 3, at para. 38.
See, e.g., Lund v. Boissoin, 2007 AHRC 11, affd [2009] A.J. No. 1345, 17 Alta. L.R.
(5th) 256 (Alta. Q.B.), affd [2012] A.J. No. 1036, 69 Alta. L.R. (5th) 272 (Alta. C.A.), where a
Human Rights Panel of Alberta found that an op-ed published in a newspaper violated Alberta’s hate
speech provision. On appeal, the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta and Alberta Court of Appeal
46
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Indeed, in Whatcott itself the Tribunal that first heard the complaint
found that all of the flyers Mr. Whatcott distributed violated
section 14(1)(b). The Saskatchewan Court of Queen’s Bench agreed, but
the Court of Appeal disagreed and held that none of the flyers breached
the Act. Finally, the Supreme Court of Canada found that two flyers
violated the law, while two others did not. Each of these decision-makers
applied the same “objective” definition of hatred in arriving at a decision,
yet each came to different conclusions. This kind of back and forth is
expected and even welcome in certain areas of the law as courts seek to
give precision to open-ended terms and statutory language. In freedom of
expression cases, however, this kind of uncertainty is deeply troubling.
Combined with the failure to account for over 20 years of new
developments, it raises a realistic concern that there will be a chilling
effect on some expression that was not intended to be caught by the
legislation. It is one thing to place restrictions on what can and cannot be
said when the subjects of these restrictions understand the limits. It is
quite another to risk discouraging political and social debates by
invoking a standard that even great legal minds are unable to consistently
decipher.
Thus, the Court largely ignored the prior experience with the
application of the Taylor definition and the uncertainty that it can breed
when it urged us to consider the “proper meaning of the words chosen by
the legislature”. The Taylor definition of hatred as “unusually strong and
deep-felt emotions of detestation, calumny and vilification” certainly
makes plain that hate speech is extreme, but it does so by replacing
“hatred” with other equally subjective terms, at least one of which —
detestation — is simply a synonym for hatred. Synonyms can sometimes
be helpful in distilling the true essence of a term, but the synonyms from
Taylor, used over and over again in hate speech jurisprudence, obviously
did not have a particularly clarifying effect. The Court in Whatcott did
not provide any assistance or guidance in this regard, and in a
particularly unhelpful portion of the judgment determined that the term
“calumny” was no longer helpful in light of its “general disuse”. In fact,
the Court’s explanation of why this term should be removed may actually
further muddy the waters by suggesting that the emotions represented by
disagreed and found no violation. Similarly, in Owens v. Saskatchewan (Human Rights
Commission), supra, note 35, a Board of Inquiry found a violation of the Saskatchewan Code and
this decision was upheld by the Court of Queen’s Bench: [2002] S.J. No. 732, 228 Sask. R. 148
(Sask. Q.B.). The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal reversed.
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the term “calumny” are neither necessary nor sufficient to find
expression hateful.47
The Court also ignored some of the experience since Taylor when it
failed to consider the chilling impact that might be occasioned even if
human rights tribunals interpret hate speech provisions appropriately.
This was one of the concerns highlighted by the Moon Report and it
relates to the investigation process undertaken by human rights
commissions as they decide which complaints will ultimately be referred
to a tribunal. Individuals may be the subject of complaints to the
Commission for expression that is controversial, but does not rise to the
level of hate speech under Taylor. While they are being investigated, they
may very well hesitate to speak out on issues of importance to them for
fear of further complaints. A similar impact may be felt on others with
similar views. Although the Court did not acknowledge it, inconsistent
court and tribunal decisions, combined with the vague definition of
hatred, creates a chill that threatens our constitutionally protected
freedom of expression.
2. Evading the Harm Problem
Justice Rothstein suggested that we can also help mitigate the
subjectivity of “hatred” if we apply the provision in light of its legislative
objectives. Hate speech is said to be problematic because of the harm
that it causes, not only to those whom it targets, but to society as a whole.
As mentioned above, the Court in Whatcott placed particular emphasis
on the societal harm that hate speech may cause and significantly less
emphasis on the more personal effects on those whom it targets. In my
view, however, the decision contains two fundamental flaws in the
manner in which it addresses the question of harm. First, the approach to
evidence of harm is sloppy. This is unfortunate because of the precedent
it sets for future cases. Second, the Court fails to grapple with the true
nature of the harm that is of concern to the legislature (and the Court)
and address whether and how the hate speech provision at issue in
Whatcott actually responds to this type of harm.
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Whatcott, supra, note 3, at para. 42.
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(a) The Evidence of Harm
The first concern about the evidentiary standard is not specific to
Whatcott or even to hate speech cases generally. Rather, the concern that
there is little concrete evidence of the harm that expression actually
causes arises in many freedom of expression cases.48 There is conflicting
social science evidence on the issue of whether or how hate speech contributes to discrimination, pornography to patriarchy and violence against
women, and depictions of violence to a more violent society. It is difficult, if not impossible, to isolate expression as the sole or even a major
contributing cause of some of society’s biggest problems. Notwithstanding the conflicting evidence, few people would take issue with the notion
that hate speech does do at least some harm to at least some people. It is
hard to read material that compares your ethnic group to vermin or describes you as “sub-human” without being hurt. One need not be the
target of the hateful expression to feel truly offended, disturbed and disgusted by these kinds of messages.
The discussion of harm in Whatcott does recognize, at least to a certain extent, that the Court is not really requiring evidence of any harm at
all in many cases where freedom of expression is implicated. Justice
Rothstein points out that the “reasonable apprehension of harm” standard
has been used in a variety of freedom of expression contexts where the
nature of the expression at issue is said to result in harm but where a
causal link cannot truly be proven. The Court is aware of the many critiques of this approach and does attempt to respond. For the Court,
however, requiring a clear causal link between expression and harm
“ignores the particularly insidious nature of hate speech. The end goal of
hate speech is to shift the environment from one where harm against vulnerable people is not tolerated to one where hate speech has created a
place where this is either accepted or a blind eye is turned.”49
With respect to the Court, this explanation is inadequate. The Court’s
strong emphasis on the effects of hate speech is paradoxically paired with
a brief and shoddy approach to the evidence of those effects. Indeed, the
Court’s reliance on evidence to support the notion that hateful messages
translate into discriminatory actions is summed up briefly as follows:
“As was clear from Taylor, and reaffirmed through the evidence
48
For a helpful discussion of this issue, see, e.g., J. Cameron, “A Reflection on
Section 2(b)’s Quixotic Journey, 1982-2012” (2012) 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) 163.
49
Whatcott, supra, note 3, at paras. 130-131 (emphasis added).
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submitted by interveners in this appeal, the discriminatory effects of hate
speech are part of the everyday knowledge and experience of
Canadians.”50 There is no discussion of what this evidence was —
whether it involved testimonies from individuals, expert reports, social
science research. If the Court is taking judicial notice of harm, this
should be made explicit. If there is evidence that goes to establishing a
reasonable apprehension of harm, it should be outlined and referenced. In
fact, the Court refers to the “evidence submitted by interveners” even
though interveners are not permitted to adduce evidence. Perhaps this
refers to secondary sources cited in argument, but this is not made plain.
Even if we are willing to accept a lower evidentiary standard in hate
speech cases, the Court’s laissez-faire approach to the evidence in
Whatcott sets a troubling precedent for all cases where the Court has
supported a more deferential approach to legislatures.
(b) The Type of Harm
The second flaw in the Court’s approach to harm is that the decision
fails to really address the nature of the harm targeted by the legislation
and engage with whether or not it is truly responsive to this type of harm.
In my view, the hateful and disturbing expression caught by the Taylor
standard appeals to a particular, and narrow, audience. It is so extreme
that those most susceptible to it are those who already share the views
being expressed. The type of expression that is much more likely to
“shift the environment” in the manner envisioned by Rothstein J. is much
tamer than the kind of expression that contains many of the “hallmarks of
hatred”. There is a strong argument that the shifting of attitudes is more
likely to be effected by subtle expressions of disapproval or concern
about a group than by explicit, hateful diatribes directed at them. Contrary to the Court’s assertions that expression that “ridicules and
belittles” a group is not rationally connected to the legislature’s goals, it
is the cartoon that pokes fun at cultural stereotypes or the op-ed on the
“dangers” of immigration from developing countries that may have the
most significant impact on stereotyping and discrimination in everyday
life. As the majority recognized in Taylor, “systemic discrimination is
much more widespread in our society than is intentional discrimination”.51
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Id., at para. 135.
Taylor, supra, note 4, at 931.
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The more subtle forms of discriminatory speech are the analogue to systemic discrimination. True hate speech, like intentional discrimination, is
much less widespread and may be ultimately less subversive in its effects.
Professor Moon’s Report argues that protecting vulnerable individuals from discrimination requires a liberal interpretive approach to human
rights provisions so that substantive equality can be achieved and so that
systemic discrimination can be tackled. At the same time, robust protection for freedom of expression mandates a narrow definition of “hatred”
so that only the most extreme forms of expression are caught by the provision. Some might contend that this simply means the provisions do not
go far enough, and that we should either try to capture all of it or at least
settle for capturing the worst of it to help mitigate or avoid some of the
harms caused by this type of expression. My contention is different.
I suggest that the messages that are excluded from the strict interpretation of hate speech provisions are far more likely to impinge upon the
rights of vulnerable groups than what is included. This contradiction is
highlighted when the Court explains that it is not the offensive ideas that
the provision prohibits, simply the mode of expression and the effect that
it may have.52
The Court’s failure to examine this issue in detail is troubling in light
of its repeated reminders that it is not the content of the expression that
the provision is concerned with, but primarily its effect. One of the rationales underlying the Court’s decision is the notion that hate speech
seeks to “silence” those it targets and therefore undermines the purposes
of freedom of expression. This argument is stated in conclusory terms
and is not, in my view, convincing.53 The most extreme forms of speech
caught by the Court’s interpretation — and containing the hallmarks of
hatred — are not the kinds of speech most individuals generally take seriously. The idea that minority groups are regularly forced to argue for
their own basic humanity gives far too much credit to those who espouse
hatred and insufficient credit to those who abhor it and who regularly
seek to promote equality and curb discrimination. It also devalues the
role of counter-speech as a powerful weapon against hate speech and
52

Whatcott, supra, note 3, at para. 51 (emphasis added).
The Court states at para. 75: “[A] particularly insidious aspect of hate speech is that it
acts to cut off any path of reply by the group under attack. It does this not only by attempting to
marginalize the group so that their reply will be ignored: it also forces the group to argue for their
basic humanity or social standing, as a precondition to participating in the deliberative aspects of our
democracy.”
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ignores the reality that it is not only targeted minorities who speak out for
their rights; many others also speak out in support.54
3. A Missed Opportunity to Reconcile Rights
A final problem with the Court’s unanimous decision in Whatcott is
that it fails to attempt to reconcile the competing rights at issue in the
case. The Court finds that hate speech “is at some distance from the spirit
of s. 2(b) because it does little to promote, and can in fact impede, the
values underlying freedom of expression”.55 As a result of this lowered
status, there is hardly a need to reconcile freedom of expression with the
right to equality and the rigorous standards that should be applied to constitutional violations are eroded. The finding that the value of the speech
is a relevant factor in assessing claims of rights violations also sends us
down a dangerous path. In particular, while the Court has always affirmed a broad ambit for the expression that is protected by section 2(b)
and left justifications to section 1, the lack of rigour in the Court’s justification analysis in Whatcott suggests that this is not how things are
operating in practice. Given the reality that prohibiting hate speech arguably has a very minimal impact on improving the rights of minority
groups and/or eradicating discrimination, this approach is disappointing.

V. MOVING FORWARD: THE NEXT 20 YEARS AND
SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES
I have argued that the Supreme Court in Whatcott missed an important opportunity to reconcile competing rights, address the critiques of
the Taylor standard, and consider the experience with over 20 years of
human rights adjudication on the question of hate speech. In my view,
the Court did not do the hard work required to really address the subjectivity problem that has plagued those deciding hate speech cases since
Taylor. The Court also put significant emphasis on the harmful effects of
54
For some recent examples of powerful counter-speech in the United States, see
Noah Michelson & Carol Hartsell, “Westboro Equality House: Aaron Jackson Paints Rainbow
Home Across from Anti-Gay Church”, Huffington Post (March 19, 2013), online: <http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/19/westboro-equality-house-aaron-jackson-rainbow_n_2906337.html>
and John Masson, “Anti-gay Kansas church spurs First Amendment talk” (August 16, 2012), online:
University of Michigan Law School <http://www.law.umich.edu/newsandinfo/features/Pages/
westboro_niehoff.aspx>.
55
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hate speech but then avoided the question of the evidentiary standard
required to establish harm and evaded a thorough exploration of the type
of harm being addressed. It is not easy to adequately reconcile the competing interests of freedom of expression, freedom of religion and
equality, so the Court evaded the issue by labelling hate speech a form of
expression that is less valuable and thus less worthy of protection. Taking
this easy way out deprived us of a thoughtful discussion on how to approach the problem of hate speech and the goal of achieving equality. It
also sidestepped the difficult questions surrounding how to address situations when sincerely held religious beliefs may be the source of
discriminatory expression and/or treatment directed at certain groups.
It remains to be seen what the next 20 years has in store for hate
speech laws. While the Whatcott decision was rendered in 2013, the flyers at the centre of the case were circulated in 2001 and 2002. Today,
hate messages can be spread around the world via micro-blogging sites
and social networks. Mr. Whatcott himself is now on Twitter and, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s judgment, he continues to spread his
messages, perhaps to an even wider audience. The Court’s decision is
certainly not the last word on hate speech, but it may be the last judicial
word for at least a few years. Those who share the view that hate speech
laws are bad policy may need to look for other means of eliminating
them. As mentioned above, in September 2011, a Private Member’s Bill
repealing the CHRA’s hate speech provision was proposed in the House
of Commons.56 Despite debate and strong expressions of concern from a
number of Members of Parliament and Senators, the bill ultimately
passed. In my view, repealing section 13, and other provisions like it, is
good public policy. Although intended to protect vulnerable minorities,
cases under hate speech provisions use up the valuable and scarce resources of human rights commissions and tribunals which should be used
to directly combat discrimination and engage in counter-speech when
hateful messages are spread around. Further, pursuing a hate speech
complaint before a tribunal and subsequent reviewing courts has a perverse effect on the spread of hateful messages. While Mr. Whatcott
began with distributing flyers in Saskatoon and Regina, he received national attention not only for his case but also for the messages that lay at
its core. His flyers are appended to a Supreme Court of Canada judgment
and thus readily available for everyone to read.
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Pursuing Mr. Whatcott under Saskatchewan’s Code made him a martyr for freedom of expression and his loss at the Supreme Court only
further emboldened him. This is not good for freedom of expression and
it is not good for equality. The Supreme Court missed an opportunity to
address this issue, but there will be other opportunities that will, hopefully, be seized. The real concern arising out of Whatcott is the impact
that its analysis may have in other freedom of expression cases.
The conflict between freedom of expression and the fight for equality is likely to continue, if not intensify, and the Court must give due
consideration to how these constitutionally protected rights can be reconciled and promoted. A number of cases have come up in recent years
where Canadian courts are asked to protect religious freedom at the expense of the equality rights of the LGBTQ community. In other cases the
courts are asked to stop discrimination in a manner that arguably infringes freedom of religion. Although these cases are often about more
than religious expression, the analysis in Whatcott may prove to be persuasive in these cases as well. The Court’s harm analysis — or its failure
to truly analyze the question of harm — is part of a disturbing trend.
Moreover, the outcome in Whatcott and the upholding of the hate speech
provision in the Saskatchewan Code should not make us complacent
about the protection of minorities and the goal of achieving substantive
equality for disadvantaged groups. Even if we accept the Court’s conclusion that these laws do help weed out discrimination, there is much work
to be done. Those who advocate for freedom of expression also have a
responsibility to speak out against hateful expression and counter it. This
approach, which requires direct action by individuals and allows for
flexibility to address a variety of modes of communication, may ultimately prove more effective than any piece of legislation in silencing or,
at least, isolating, those who preach hate.

